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RADIOACTIVE ROULETTE: SHOULD THE 
NUCLEAR REGUlATORY COMMISSION BE 
REGULATING THE UNITED STATES ARMY 
CORPS OF ENGINEERS' FUSRAP 
ACTIVITIES? 
MATTHEW HUGHEV* 
Abstract: The Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program was 
created in 1974 to clean up radioactive waste at sites used in the nation's 
early atomic energy and atomic weapons programs. For over two 
decades, this program was administered by the Department of Energy 
and its predecessor agencies. In 1997, responsibility for FUSRAP was 
shifted to the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The transfer did 
not occur without controversy. Congress transferred the program with 
little legislative direction. Almost immediately, questions arose about the 
Corps' authority to administer to program without appropriate permits 
from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Since 1997, the NRC has 
repeatedly asserted that it does not have the authority to govern the 
remediation activities of another agency in the federal government. 
This Note explores the reasons why NRC regulation of the Corps' 
FUSRAP activities is not only proper, but should be undertaken in the 
interests of public health and safety. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 13, 1997, President Clinton signed the Energy and 
Water Development Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1998.1 This ap-
propriations bill contained an important provision transferring a little 
known Department of Energy (DOE) environmental remediation 
program, the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program 
(FUSRAP), to the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps).2 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENvIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW, 2002-03. 
The author would like to thank his family for their tremendous support. 
1 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-62, tit. 1, 
111 Stat. 1320, 1326 (1997). 
2 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-271, at 36-37 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1811, 
1846-47; see Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
62, tit. 1, 111 Stat. 1320, 1326. 
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FUSRAP was created in 1974 to remediate contamination at sites cre-
ating fissionable material used by two of DOE's predecessor agencies, 
the Manhattan Engineer District (MED) and the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC). 3 Most of the radioactive material at FUSRAP sites 
was contaminated with low levels of uranium, thorium, and radium.4 
By the time of the transfer, DOE identified forty-six sites in the pro-
gram and had remediated twenty-four.5 
Congress, however, had become dissatisfied with the manner and 
speed with which DOE administered FUSRAP.6 This dissatisfaction 
not only led to the transfer of the program from DOE to the Corps, 
but Congress also agreed to almost double the program's budget.7 
There was considerable belief that the transfer to the Corps would 
significantly hasten the remediation of the twenty-two remaining 
FUSRAP sites and reduce costs at the same time.s 
Congress' faith in the Corps to make "significant cost and sched-
ule''9 efficiencies may have been incorrect.10 According to the Corps' 
estimates the program would take between four and seven years 
longer and cost between $560 and $970 million more than under the 
DOE plan.ll Along with the increased costs comes the belief that the 
remediation criteria used by the Corps are more lenient than those 
used previously by DOE.12 
~ s. REp. No. 105-206, at 77 (1998); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, FORMERLY UTIliZED 
SITES REMEDIAL ACTION PROGRAM (FUSRAP): REpORT TO CONGRESS 1 (1998) [hereinafter 
FUSRAP REpORT]. 
4 FUSRAP REpORT, supra note 3, at 1; Charles H. Montange, Federal Nuclear Waste Dis-
posa~ 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 309, 357 n.323 (1987). 
5 FUSRAP REpORT, supra note 3, at 1. 
6 Michael Grunwald, Nuclear Cleanup's Fallout: Role of Army Corps Engineers in N. Y. Spurs 
Criticism, WASH. POST, Apr. 10,2000, at AI. 
7Id. 
S H.R. CONF. REp. No. 105-271, at 36-37 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.CA.N. 1811, 
1846-47 ('The Corps currently manages and executes a similar program, the Formedy 
Used Defense Sites program, for the Department of Defense, and the conferees believe 
there are significant cost and schedule benefits to be gained by having the Corps manage 
FUSRAP as well. "); Grunwald, supra note 6, at AI. 
9 H.R. CONF. REp. 105-271, at 36-37. 
10 FUSRAP REpORT, supra note 3, at 36. "DOE proposed plan for completing FUSRAP 
by the year 2002, at a remaining FW8-02 cost of$910 is questionable." Id. 
II Id. "Under this [unconstrained baseline] scenario, the program would be complete 
by the year 2006 at a remaining cost of $1.56 billion. With constrained budgets ... , at an 
annual funding level of $140 million, the program would cost $1.88 billion and not be 
complete until 2011." Id. 
12 See id.; see also Grunwald, supra note 6, at AI. Local residents at the Ashland 2 FUS-
RAP site in North Tonawanda, New York have been angered by the Corps' announcement 
that the "maximum cleanup standard for uranium would be 600 picocuries per gram-six 
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The transfer has also raised several legal questions, the most im-
portant of which is whether the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) should regulate the Corps' FUSRAP activitiesY~ 
In 1998, the Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) peti-
tioned the NRC to use its authority to ensure that the Corps handles 
FUSRAP waste in accordance with NRC procedures.14 Envirocare of 
Utah, Inc., a low-level waste management and disposal firm, and the 
Snake River Alliance, an environmental group, filed a similar petition 
in early 2000.15 Envirocare simultaneously pursued a civil action in the 
Court of Federal Claims to prevent the Corps from contracting for the 
removal ofFUSRAP waste.16 
The NRDC and Envirocare petitions both claimed that the legis-
lation purportedly transferring authority over FUSRAP from DOE to 
the Corps was defective.I' Both challenges claimed the Corps could 
not administer the program because, unlike DOE, the Corps is not 
exempt from the licensing requirements of the Atomic Energy Act 
(AEA).18 The Corps responded by stating that Congress directed it to 
conduct its FUSRAP activities according to the provisions of the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA).19 The Corps claimed that its on-site remediation 
times higher than any previous radiation cleanup plan, and 10 times higher than the 
original maximum set by the [DOE]." Id. 
15 See Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 474, 477-78 (1999); In re 
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. 299, 302 (1999). 
14 Receipt of Petition for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Action, 63 Fed. Reg. 
67,494,67,494-02 (Dec. 7, 1998). 
15 Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 C.F.R. 2.206, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,909 (Dec. 20, 
2000); see NRC Punts on Regulation; Waits for NAS Findings, NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Dec. 21, 
2000, available in Westlaw, 2000 WL 29762569. 
16 Envirocare, 44 Fed. Cl. at 476. 
17 See Corps ofEng'T$, 49 NRC. at 302; see also Envirocare, 44 Fed. Cl. at 483. Envirocare 
claimed that the rules of both the House and the Senate "prohibit 'legislating' in appro-
priation acts." Envirocare, 44 Fed. Cl. at 483 (citation omitted). 
18 Corps of Eng'T$, 49 NRC. at 302. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2014(s), DOE is exempted from 
the licensing provisions of the Atomic Energy Act because it is exempt from the following 
definition of person(s) required to obtain an NRC license: 'The term 'person' means 
(1) any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or pri-
vate institution, group, Government agency other than the Commission .•• , and (2) any legal 
successor ... of the foregoing." Id. (emphasis added); Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2014-2023 (2001). DOE is the legal successor of the AEC. FUSRAP REpORT, supra note 
3, at 1. 
19 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). 
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activities did not require an NRC license because of the federal per-
mit waiver in section 121 (e) (1) ofCERClA.2o 
In a 1999 decision, the NRC sided with the Corps, concluding 
that Congress did not give the NRC a "clear directive to oversee the 
[Corps'] on-going effort under CERClA to complete the FUSRAP 
cleanup project. "21 Citing a reluctance to commit scarce NRC re-
sources to oversee a "sister federal agency" and concerns about the 
ambiguity of DOE's role in the program, the NRC accepted that the 
Corps' activities were shielded by the CERClA permit waiver provi-
sion.22 Going one step further, the NRC stated that it did not have ju-
risdiction to regulate some of the Corps' disposal activities even if the 
waiver did not apply.23 
This Note will explore the question of whether the NRC should 
be regulating the Corps' FUSRAP remediation and disposal activities. 
Section I will provide a brief history of the origins of the FUSRAP 
program and the evolution of DOE. Section II will discuss the transfer 
of FUSRAP from DOE to the Corps. Section III will explore the 
NRDC and Envirocare challenges to the Corps' administration of 
FUSRAP. Section IV will closely examine the question of whether the 
NRC's failure to regulate the Corps' FUSRAP activities represents a 
breach of the Commission's statutory duties. 
I. A HISTORY OF FUSRAP AND THE CHANGING ROLES 
(AND NAMES) OF DOE: FROM THE MANHATTAN 
ENGINEERING DISTRICT TO 1997 
The problem of ascertaining which federal agency should regu-
late the disposal of FUSRAP waste can be traced to the tortured his-
tory of DOE and its predecessor agencies.24 From 1946 through 1977, 
the federal agencies that regulate energy research, development, and 
20 Id. § 9621 (e) (1). This section states that "[n]o Federal, State, or local permit shall 
be required for the portion of any removal or remedial action conducted entirely onsite, 
where such remedial action is selected and carried out in compliance with this section." Id. 
21 Ctnps of Eng'rs, 49 N .R.C. at 309. 
22 Id. 
2~ Id. at 307-08. 
24 See FUSRAP REpORT, supra note 3, at 1; see also Peter Eisler, Contaminated Communities 
Remain, USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 2000, at A4 (noting that properties identified for decontami-
nation by DOE and subsequently turned over to Corps jurisdiction have been found to 
have had "obvious evidence of contamination"). 
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licensing underwent at least three major reorganizations.25 For exam-
ple, the federal agency that created FUSRAP does not even exist any-
more.26 The various reorganizations led to jurisdictional problems 
that continue to plague FUSRAP today.27 
A. The Manhattan Engineering District and the Atomic Energy Commission 
During World War II, the federal government created the Man-
hattan Engineering District (MED) to direct the development of the 
nuclear bomb.28 While most sites producing fissile and other materials 
needed to manufacture the bomb were federally owned, some of the 
material was produced under contract with the private sector on pri-
vate land.29 During the war, the main goal of the MED and its subcon-
tractors was to complete construction of the bomb.30 Safe disposal of 
the radioactive waste generated was not a priority.31 As a result, the 
universities, machine plants, and other private facilities used in the 
process became contaminated with "primarily low levels of uranium, 
thorium, and radium, with their associated decay products. "32 This 
, contamination created a situation where radioactivity was above nor-
mal background levels.33 
Mter World War II, control over the nation's nuclear weapons 
program was shifted to the civilian Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC). M The AEC was authorized by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 
1946 to establish "instructions by rule, regulation, or order, governing 
the possession and use of nuclear material and the operation of facili-
25 See Atomic Energy Act of 1946,42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297 (2000); Energy Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (2000); Department of Energy Organization Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (2000). 
26 FUSRAP REPORT, supra note 3, at 16. 
27 [d. at 17. 
l!8 Navajo Tribe v. United States, 9 CI. Ct. 227, 249 (1985); see Eisler, supra note 24, at 
A4. 
29 FUSRAP REPORT, supra note 3, at 5. 
so Eisler, supra note 24, at A4. 
51 [d. 
52 FUSRAP REpORT, supra note 3, at I, 5. 
55 [d. at 14. 
M Atomic Energy Act of 1946,42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297 (2000); S. REP. No. 1211, § 2 
(1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1328. 'The Atomic Energy Commission is the 
principle administrative body established in the bill. As such, it is responsible for adminis-
tering domestic controls over atomic energy, for carrying on production, research and 
development programs, and for stimulating and supporting private research and devel-
opment." [d. 
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ties used in conducting its activities. "35 As early as 1946, Congress rec-
ognized that the radioactive materials (fissionable, source, and by-
product materials) created under the auspices of the AEC might rep-
resent a danger to human health.36 
Under AEC administration, concerns about MED radioactive 
contamination became more acute.37 Despite the growing Soviet 
threat and accelerating nuclear weapons program, the AEC retained 
broad power to promulgate health and safety regulations at AEC 
sites.38 The power of AEC to regulate activities involving nuclear ma-
terials was not limited to federal facilities. 39 The AEA of 1954 stated 
that title to all nuclear material in the country was vested in the fed-
eral government.40 Thus, the AEC could extend its jurisdiction to pri-
vate off-site activities.41 Seizing on this broad power, AEC began to de-
contaminate sites contaminated under the MED and AEC from the 
1940s through the 1960s.42 Sites decontaminated to the relatively 
primitive standards used by the AEC during this time were released 
for other uses under applicable regulations.43 
B. Bifurcation of the Atomic Energy Commission's Administrative and 
Regulatory Programs: Creation of DOE and the NRC 
In 1974, Congress set about reorganizing and consolidating the 
AEC.44 The energy shocks of the early 1970s required the creation of a 
broad based energy policy.45 Concerned that the AEC's twenty-year 
focus on nuclear power would inhibit the Commission's ability to 
55 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Abraham, 244 F.3d 742, 744 nn.5, 6 (9th Cir. 
2001), citing42 U.S.C. §§ 2201 (b), 2201 (i) (3). 
36 S. REp. No 1211, § 12 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1335. The Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946 granted the AEC the authority to "establish safety and health regula-
tions for the possession and use of fissionable and byproduct materials to minimize the 
danger from explosion, radioactivity, and other harmful or toxic effects incident to the frresence of 
such materials." [d. (emphasis added). 
57 Eisler, sUfrra note 24, at A4; see FUSRAP REpORT, sUfrra note 3, at 5. 
38 SeeS. REp. No. 83-1699, ch. 14 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3456, 3481-82. 
Much of the Senate report accompanying the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is laced with 
references to "Red military power" and the "Soviet dictators that [may] attempt to occupy 
free Europe." [d., reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3456, 3458. 
~9 See id. ch. 6, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3456,3471. 
40 [d. 
41 See id.; Atomic Energy Act ofl954 § 52e(5), 42 U.S.C. § 2076 (2000). 
42 See FUSRAP REpORT, sUfrra note 3, at 5. 
4~ See id. 
44 Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (2000). 
45 S. REp. No. 93-980, § 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5470, 5479. 
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make unbiased decisions about non-nuclear energy sources, Congress 
eliminated the AEC.46 
Passage of the act abolishing the AEC, the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974, led to a dramatic reordering of the nation's nuclear ad-
ministrative and regulatory regimes.47 The Energy Research and De-
velopment Administration (ERDA) took over most of the research 
and development responsibilities previously vested in the AEC.48 The 
AEC's commercial licensing and related regulatory functions were 
transferred to a newly created, independent regulatory agency, the 
NRC.49 The ERDA retained an exemption allowing them to conduct 
activities that would otherwise require a NRC license.5o 
Three years later, Congress again acted to reorganize energy re-
sponsibilities at the federal leve1.51 Citing "organizational problems 
resulting from the fragmentation of responsibilities" that "hampered 
the Government's ability to formulate, implement, and enforce a co-
herent and consistent national energy policy," Congress created a 
cabinet-level department in the executive branch, the Department of 
Energy (DOE) .52 The ERDA was one of several independent agencies, 
and programs in other departments, whose responsibilities were 
transferred to DOE.53 By assuming the duties of the ERDA, DOE be-
came responsible for remediation of sites used by the ERDA's prede-
cessor agencies, the MED and the AEC.54 
46 [d., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 5470, 5480. Despite this concern, Congress used 
AEC personnel as the backbone for its new creation, the Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration. [d. 
4742 U.S.C. §§ 5812, 5814. 
48 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Abraham, 244 F.3d 742, 744-45 (9th Cir. 2001); see 
42 U.S.C. §§ 5814, 5841. 
49 42 U.S.C. §§ 5841-5849; S. REP. No. 93-980, § 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5470, 
5483. 
50 See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(s); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text. ERDA (and 
subsequently, DOE) facilities that are "authorized for 'subsequent long-term storage of 
high-level radioactive waste by the Administration'" were notably excepted from this ex-
emption. Natural Res. Def. Council, 244 F.3d at 745, citing42 U.S.C. § 5842 (2000). No such 
exception was made for low-level waste facilities. &e S. REp. No. 93-980, § 6 (1974), re-
printed in 1974 u.S.C.C.A.N. 5470, 5485. 
51 Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (2001). 
52 S. REp. No. 95-164, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 854, 856-57. At the 
time of the passage of the Department of Energy Organization Act, "[t] here were over 100 
energy programs in 4 agencies." [d. 
53 Department of Energy Organization Act § 301 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 7151. 
54 FUSRAP REpORT, supra note 3, at 5. 
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C. Creation and Administration of FUSRAP 
FUSRAP was created under ERDA auspices in 1974.55 The ERDA 
determined that sites used to manufacture materials used in the early 
atomic weapons program "were not adequately decontaminated to 
1970's health and safety standards."56 When ERDA functions were 
transferred to DOE in the Department of Energy Organization Act, 
DOE assumed control of the nascent FUSRAP program.57 
Mter assuming control over FUSRAP, DOE began to undertake 
additional cleanup measures at sites where ERDA action had already 
been taken.58 The setting of remediation standards was somewhat in-
hibited by the fact that FUSRAP was not specifically defined by stat-
ute.59 Passage of CERCIA provided more clarity, but also imposed ad-
ditional remediation requirements on federal facilities. 60 DOE utilized 
FUSRAP clean-ups to meet the "newly applicable human health and 
environmental standards," including the new environmental restora-
tion standards imposed by CERCIA.61 
From the creation of the Department in 1977 until 1997, FUS-
RAP was funded and administered by DOE through the annual ap-
propriations process.62 In almost two decades, DOE identified forty-six 
sites to be remediated by the FUSRAP program in fourteen states.63 
DOE identified sites suitable for inclusion in FUSRAP by 
"[i]dentifying and evaluating all sites used to support early MED/ AEC 
nuclear work and determin[ing] whether the sites need decontamina-
tion and/or control."64 By 1997, DOE had completed decontamina-
tion at twenty-four sites, restoring the sites to a condition in line with 
"appropriate federal laws and regulations" and local land use and en-
vironmental standards.65 
As noted earlier, one of the primary difficulties faced by DOE 
during its administration of FUSRAP was determining the "appropri-
55Id. at 16. 
56 Id. 
57Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See s. REp. No. 105-206, at 77 (1998); FUSRAP REpORT, supra note 3, at 16. 
60 FUSRAP REpORT, supra note 3, at 16. 
61Id. 
62 S. REp. No. 105-206, at 77 (1998). 
63 FUSRAP REpORT, supra note 3, at 5. 
64 Id. Congress also directed DOE to include five additional sites in FUSRAP "because 
of their similarity with or proximity to sites in the program, even though they did not meet 
the programmatic standards for inclusion in FUSRAP." Id. 
65 Id. 
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ate approach to establish general site cleanup criteria. ''66 DOE, the 
NRC, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) each had 
standards regulating the cleanup of radioactive materials.67 DOE, 
however, enjoyed a distinct advantage.68 DOE remediation activities 
did not require a NRC license, due to the exemption provided by the 
AEA.69 This exemption was limited to DOE activities, and most activi-
ties conducted by DOE contractors; it did not extend to other gov-
ernment parties.70 The narrowness of this exemption would create 
problems after the transfer of the program from DOE to the Corps. 71 
II. "MUCK AND TRUCK":72 THE TRANSFER OF FUSRAP 
FROM DOE TO THE CORPS 
While DOE continued its efforts to remediate the environmental 
hot spots created by the Cold War, trouble was brewing in Washing-
ton. 73 Republicans in Congress were targeting the Department of En-
ergy for elimination.74 Secretary Hazel O'Leary was under fire for 
various political and personal reasons.75 
Against this background, Congressman Joseph McDade (R-Pa.), 
Chairman of the House Appropriations Energy and Water Develop-
66 Id. at 17. 
67Id. 
68 See generally In re United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. 299, 302 (1999) 
(noting that DOE was exempted from licensing requirements of the AEA). 
69 Atomic Energy Act of 1954,42 U.S.C. § 2014(s) (2000). The Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 provided an exemption from the AEC's licensing requirements for activities con-
ducted by the AEC. Id. As a legal successor to the AEC, DOE retained the exemption. Id. 
70See Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 302. Congress implied in the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 that this exemption applied to Commission activities only. "Government agencies are on 
equal footing with all others before the [AEC] with respect to obtaining licenses from the 
Commission, since the definition of 'persons' specifically includes Government agencies 
(other than the Commission)." H.R. CONF. REp. No. 83-2639 (1954), reprinted in 1954 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3529, 3530. 
71 See Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 302. One of the primary contentions offered by the 
NRDC in its petition for NRC licensing of the Corps' FUSRAP activities was that the licens-
ing exception enjoyed by DOE as legal successor to AEC was not transferable to the Corps. 
Id. 
72 Grunwald, supra note 6, at AI. This was the pejorative nickname given to the Corps' 
remediation methods. It refers to the Corps' technique of aggressively removing supposed 
contaminants without paying sufficient attention to the overall effect of its activities. See id. 
73Id. 
74 Id. In 1996, Senator Rod Grams (R-Minn.) introduced legislation that would have 
eliminated the Department of Energy. S. 236, 105th Congo (1996). This movement has not 
died down; Congressman Ed Royce (R-Cal.) introduced similar legislation in 1999. H.R. 
2411, 106th Congo (1999). 
75 Grunwald, supra note 6, at AI. 
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ment Subcommittee, decided that FUSRAP was the perfect DOE pro-
gram to target.76 McDade was furious that so little progress had been 
made in FUSRAP in over twenty years of DOE stewardship, as well as 
the fact that the primary contractor had not been changed since 
1980.77 He asked the Corps if it was comfortable assuming control 
over the program.78 The Corps responded positively and in 1988, after 
overcoming opposition from the Clinton Administration and the Sen-
ate, the Corps assumed operational control after passage of the En-
ergy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1998.79 
The transfer was accompanied with very little in the way of con-
gressional guidance.8o The conference report accompanying the En-
ergy and Water Development Appropriations Act provided almost 
nothing more in the way of direction other than the title to one of the 
legislation's sections.81 With regards to the remediation standard to be 
employed, the report merely directed the Corps to "select an organi-
zation and process within the Corps which can execute this high pri-
ority program most effectively and efficiently. "82 Questions remained 
about DOE's continuing role (if any) and operative regulations gov-
erning the Corps' remediation activities.83 
76 [d. 
77 [d. Bechtel, a well<onnected environmental remediation conglomerate, had been 
the primary FUSRAP contractor since 1980. [d. 
78 [d. McDade is quoted as stating, "So I asked the Corps if they thought they could 
take it on instead [of DOE). They said, 'Hell, yeah.'" [d. 
79 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. lO5-62, tit. 
1, III Stat. 1320, 1326 (1997); Grunwald, supra note 6, at AI. Senate Democrats and Re-
publicans opposed the transfer of the program, voting against the transfer at a subcommit-
tee mark-up. After some horse-trading, the Democrats backed down. Grunwald, supra note 
6, atA1. 
80 See Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-62, 
tit. 1, 111 Stat. 1320, 1326. The text of the provision reads: 
For the expenses necessary to administer and execute the Formerly Utilized 
Sites Remedial Action Program to clean up contaminated sites throughout 
the U.S. where work was performed as part of the nation's early atomic en-
ergy program, $140,000,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, 
that the unexpected balances of prior appropriations provided for these ac-
tivities in this Act or any previous Energy and Water Development Appropria-
tions Act may be transferred to and merged with this appropriation account, 
and thereafter, may be accounted for as one fund for the same time period as 
originally enacted. 
[d. There is no mention of the Corps or DOE. See id. 
81 See H.R. CONF. REp. No. lO5-271, at 36-37 (1997), reprinted at 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1811,1846-47. 
82 [d. 
83 See[n reUnited States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. 299, 301 (1999). 
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The result was confusion about the appropriate remediation 
standard.84 While the Corps recognized that the "DOE, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), and EPA all have standards for the 
cleanup of ... radioactive materials," it concentrated primarily on the 
remediation standards and administrative procedures of CERCIA.85 
The Corps reached this conclusion in spite of the fact that only six of 
the twenty-two FUSRAP sites that remained to be remediated were 
National Priority List (NPL) , or Superfund, sites.86 
Perhaps in response to the confusion caused by the abrupt trans-
fer of a program that DOE had administered for over twenty years, 
Congress attempted to clarify their intentions.87 On November 6, 
1997, Senator Pete Domenici (R-N .M.) and Congressman McDade 
sent a letter to Energy Secretary Federico Pena and Defense Secretary 
William Cohen to clarify the respective roles of DOE and the COrpS.88 
They made clear that the Corps would assume operational, day-to-day 
control over FUSRAP sites that had not yet been remediated.89 The 
letter emphasized, however, that "basic underlying authorities for the ~ 
gram remain unaltered and the responsibility of DOE."90 
Seeking to smooth the transition of the program from DOE to 
the Corps, Congress next directed the agencies to enter into a Memo-
randum of Understanding (MOU) .91 The purpose of the MOU was to 
"remedy any misunderstanding that may exist between the two agen-
cies as to the roles and responsibilities related to the cleanup pro-
gram."92 The Corps and DOE executed this MOU in March 1999.9S 
DOE retained responsibility for, among other things, previously com-
pleted sites, long-term operation and maintenance, and "certain re-
sponsibilities regarding the designation of any potential additional 
84 See FUSRAP REPoRT, supra note 3, at 17. 
85 Id. "Sites will be remediated in accordance with the CERCLA and National Contin-
gency Plan (NCP) process, as has been successfully applied at Superfund sites with similar 
radioactive contamination." Id. at 2. 
86 Id. at 7. 
87 See Corps ofEng'Ts, 49 NRC. at 301; HR REp. No. 106-253, at 75-76 (1999). 
88 Corps ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 301. 
89 Id. 
9() Id. 
91 S. REp. No. 105-206, at 77 (1998). 
92 Id. 
95 On H.R. 910, The San Galniel Basin Water QJtality Initiative, and the Rok of the Corps of 
Engineers in the Formerly Utilized Sites RerMdial Action Program (FUSRAP) Before the House Sub-
comm. on Water ResUUTces and the Environment, 106th Cong., (1999) [hereinafter San Galniel 
Hearings] (statement of Brigadier General Hans A. Van Winkle), availabk in Westlaw, 1999 
WL 27594995. 
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sites. ''94 The Corps was made responsible for "completing remediation 
at sites which were not completed as of October 13, 1997 ... and for 
the evaluation of potential additional sites to determine whether 
cleanup is warranted. "95 In addition, the Corps retained budgetary 
authority over FUSRAP.96 
Believing that the respective roles of DOE and the Corps had 
been addressed by the congressional clarification and the MOU, 
Congress next attempted to specify the legislative authority control-
ling Corps activity.97 The Energy and Water Development Appropria-
tions Act for fiscal year 1999 stated "[t]hat response actions by the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers under this program shall be 
subject to the administrative, procedural, and regulatory provisions of 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Li-
ability Act, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan. ''98 Congress reaffirmed this statement the following 
year before weighing in on the issue that had spurred administrative 
and legal challenges: Should the NRC regulate the Corps' FUSRAP 
activities?99 
III. THINGS GET COMPLICATED: VARIOUS CHALLENGES TO THE CORPS' 
AUTHORITY AND ITS REMEDIATION PROCEDURES 
While Congress attempted to clearly spell out its intent in trans-
ferring FUSRAP to the Corps, challenges to the Corps' oversight of 
the program and legal authority sprouted. 1OO The NRDC was the first 
party to challenge the Corps' supervision of the program, contending 
that it required an NRC license to conduct its remediation activi-
ties.I°1 Envirocare of Utah, Inc. followed the NRDC, filing administra-
tive and legal challenges to the Corps' authority to conduct its FUS-
94 Id. 
95Id. 
96 Id.; Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1998, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 
105-62, III Stat. 1320, 1326 (1997). 
97 See Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1999, tit. I, Pub L. No.105-
245, II2 Stat. 1838, 1843 (1998); H.R. REp. No. 106-253, at 75 (1999); H.R. CONF. REp. 
No. 105-749, at II (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 444, 445. 
98 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1999, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 105-
245, Il2 Stat. 1838, 1843 (1998) (citations omitted). 
99 H.R. REp. No. 106-253, at 76. 
100 See Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 474, 477 (1999); Receipt of 
Petition for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Action, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,494, 67,494-02 
(Dec. 7, 1998). 
101 63 Fed. Reg. 67,494-02. 
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RAP activities without a NRC license.102 Although these legal chal-
lenges helped frame the legal issues involved, the debate over NRC 
regulation continued, shifting back to the halls of Congress. lOS 
A. The NRDC's Petition to the NRC and the NRC Decision 
1. The NRDC's Petition and Their Argument for NRC licensing of 
Corps' FUSRAP Activities 
The NRDC filed their challenge at the NR004 in October of 
1998, contending that the NRC should "exert authority to ensure that 
the [Corps'] handling of radioactive materials in connection with the 
[FUSRAP] is effected in accord with [a] properly issued license and 
all other applicable requirements. "105 The NRC essentially stated that 
this was a matter of first impression and acknowledged that it did not 
require the Corps to obtain a license at the time of the NRDC chal-
lenge.1oo 
The NRDC's basic contention was that the transfer legislation, 
ostensibly shifting control of FUSRAP to the Corps, did not transfer 
legal authority of the program to the Corps.107 In other words, the En-
ergy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1998 shifted day-
to-day control over the program to the Corps, but DOE retained ulti-
102 Envirocare, 44 Fed. Cl. at 476; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206, 
65 Fed. Reg. 79,909 (Dec. 20, 2000). The Snake River Alliance joined Envirocare in this 
administrative challenge. Envirocare, 44 Fed. Cl. at 476; Issuance of Director's Decision 
Under 10 CFR 2.206, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,909. 
I05See The Nuclear Regulatury Comm 'n Authorization Act Fur the Fiscal Year 2000, Hearing Be-
Jure the House Subcomm. on Energy and Power oj the Comm. on Commerce on H.R 2531, 106th 
Congo 45-46 (1999) (statement of David E. Adelman, Project Attorney, Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.) [hereinafter NRC Hearin~]. 
104 Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.202 (a) , the NRC can "institute a proceeding to modify, sus-
pend, or revoke a license or to take such other action as may be proper." Like many ad-
ministrative agencies, the NRC can hold hearings to determine any issue that is subject to 
the jurisdiction of NRC. See itl. Moreover, "any person may file a request to institute a pro-
ceeding pursuant to § 2.202." NRC, Procedures for Imposing Requirements by Order, or 
for Modification, Suspension, or Revocation of a License, or for Imposing Civil Penalties, 
10 C.F.R. § 2.206(a) (2001). The NRDC filed its petition pursuant to this section. 
105 Receipt of Petition for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Action, 63 Fed. Reg. 
67,494,67,494. 
106 See id. "In October 1997, Congress transferred funding for FUSRAP from DOE to 
the Corps. NRDC believes that the Corps should obtain an NRC license to conduct activi-
ties under FUSRAP. At this time, the NRC has not required the Corps to obtain a license." 
Id. 
107 In reUnited States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. 299, 302 (1999). 
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mate legal authority. lOS The NRDC claimed that nothing in the trans-
fer legislation suggests a "contrary result; the text does not grant [the 
Corps] anything beyond budget authority over FUSRAP. "109 
According to the NRDC, this interpretation created a regulatory 
and oversight problem.uo DOE, while it administered the program, 
enjoyed a license exemption provided by the AEA.111 Unlike DOE and 
its contractors, the Corps is "not exempt from the licensing require-
ments" of the AEA.ll2 Further, DOE acknowledged that it could not 
extend its licensing exemption for its private contractors to the Corps 
and that DOE had no regulatory authority over the Corps' FUSRAP 
activities. ll3 Absent an exemption from NRC licensing or authorized 
DOE supervision, the NRDC claimed that the Corps did not have 
authority without first obtaining a license from the NRC.114 
The NRDC paired its legal argument with a public policy discus-
sion.ll5 It contended that the Corps was not suited to carry out FUS-
RAP remediation without the supervision of the NRC.u6 It claimed 
that the primary mission of the NRC was to ensure the "safety and se-
curity of the nation's nuclear activities."117 The Corps' primary mis-
sion, by contrast, was to focus on construction and other projects, not 
environmental remediation. us 
Further, the NRDC was concerned that the Corps was relying 
solely on CERClA for its guidelines regarding FUSRAP remediation 
projects.119 The NRDC contended that the cleanup of radioactive ma-
terials was highly technical,12o For this reason, Congress placed the 
administrative power for the cleanup and disposal of radioactive ma-
terials in the NRC and DOE.l2l That is precisely why Congress "com-
manded that, with very few exceptions, no agencies other than DOE 
text. 
lOB See id. 
109 NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 46. 
110 Corps ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 302. 
m Atomic Energy Act, 42 u.S.C. § 2014(s) (2000); see supra note 18 and accompanying 
112 Corps ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 302. 
mId. 
114Id. 
115 Id.; NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 46. 
116 Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N .R.C. at 302. 
117 NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 46. 
118 Id. During his testimony, Mr. Adelman alluded to the problems that the Corps was 
having at the Ashland 2 FUSRAP site in North Tonawanda, New York. Id.; see discussion 
supra at note 12. 
119 NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 46. 
120 Id. 
121Id. 
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be permitted to handle nuclear materials except in accordance with a 
license issued by the NRC. "122 Thus, the Corps could only benefit 
from NRC supervision, especially when it comes to handing radioac-
tive material that may remain hazardous for "thousands of years. "123 
2. The Corps' Counterargument 
By the time of the NRC decision, the Corps had a particularly 
good reason for its reliance on CERCLA.124 By March 1999, Congress 
had stated that Corps FUSRAP activities were to be governed by CER-
CLA.125 According to the Corps, this congressional mandate afforded 
it the protections of a federal permit waiver contained in CERCLA.I26 
Under section 121 of CERCLA, federal cleanup activities conducted 
entirely on site initiated under the authority of CERCLA do not re-
quire federal, state, or local permits.I27 According to the Corps, this 
permit waiver stripped the authority of the NRC to regulate the 
Corps' onsite remediation activities under FUSRAP.128 
Further, the Corps contended that Congress intended that it act 
as the legal successor of DOE, as the party responsible for the supervi-
sion of FUSRAP.I29 If the NRC accepted this contention, it would ren-
der the NRDC's legal argument moot.130 Under the AEA, the actions 
taken by a legal successor of the AEC (ERDA and DOE) are shielded 
from the licensing provisions of the Act.131 If the Corps is a designated 
122Id. 
mId. The NRDC stated further that FUSRAP sites were "not your typical Superfund 
project," because they involved radioactive contaminants that had halflives of thousands of 
years.Id. 
124 See Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1999, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 
105-245,112 Stat. 1838, 1843 (1998). 
125 Congress had passed the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1999, 
on October 8, 1998. This Act contained the provision ordering the Corps to undertake 
FUSRAP cleanups subject to the procedures of CERCLA. See supra note 98 and accompany-
ing text. The NRC decision on the NRDC petition was not handed down until March 26, 
1999. In reUnited States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. 299,299 (1999). 
126 See Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 303; see text of 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (e) (1) (2000), supra 
note 20. 
127 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (e) (1); see McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. 
Cheney, 763 F. Supp. 431, 434 (E.D. Cal. 1989). 
128 Corps ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 303. Note that the exemption applies only to remedia-
tion activities undertaken entirely on site. The Corps did not assert, nor did the NRC ac-
cept, that the CERCLA permit waiver would protect its off-site activities (primarily disposal 
of waste material). Id. at 307. 
129 Id. at 303. 
1M Seeid. 
UI Id.; see discussion supra at notes 69-70. 
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legal successor of the AEC, the NRC is without authority to license its 
activities.I!l2 
3. The NRC Decision: A Victory for the Corps and aJurisdictional 
Problem 
In short, the NRC denied the NRDC's request to require the 
Corps to obtain a NRC license to conduct FUSRAP activities.l!l!l The 
rationales for the decision, however, were slightly more compli-
cated.I!l4 The NRC accepted that the Corps was entitled to the federal 
permit waiver protections of CERCLA.I!l5 In addition, the NRC stated 
that it did not have jurisdiction to regulate Corps activity at several 
FUSRAP siteS.I!l6 
The NRC explained why the Corps' argument-that its activities 
were covered by the CERCLA federal permit waiver-was correct.137 
The NRC accepted the Corps' contention that because "Congress 
specifically subjected FUSRAP sites to the provisions of CERCLA in 
the 1999 Act, section 121 (e)( 1) applies to Corps response actions at 
FUSRAP sites."1!l8 Since section 121(e)(1) applies to federal agencies, 
and the Corps can "take the role of 'lead agency' in a CERCLA 
cleanup action," it is entitled to the protections of the waiver.139 
Citing cases mentioned in the Corps' response to the NRC in-
quiry, the NRC agreed with the federal court's holding that the sec-
tion 121(e) waiver allows government bodies, such as the Corps, to 
avoid NRC licensing, even though it would be necessary absent the 
waiver.l40 For example, in McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) 
v. Cheney, the plaintiff claimed that the Department of Defense was 
152 CurpS ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 303. DOE disagreed with the Corps on this point when 
the NRC solicited its opinion. DOE stated that the NRC should "evaluate the licensability 
of the Corps' activities in the same manner as it would evaluate the activities of any other 
'person' within the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act." Id. Thus, according to DOE, if the 
Corps escaped NRC licensing authority, it was not because of the waiver provided under 
the AEA. See ill. NRC would accept DOE's interpretation of the AEA exemption, thus re-
jecting the Corps' argument. Id. at 309. 
155 Id. at 304. 
1114 Id. at 304-09. 
155 Id. at 304. 
136 Id. at 307-09. 
157 Curps ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 304. 
136 Id. 
159 Id. at 305. 
140 Id. at 305-06; see United States v. City of Denver, 100 F.3d 1509, 1513 (lOth Cir. 
1996); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Cheney, 763 F. Supp. 431, 434 
(E.D. Cal. 1989). 
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required to obtain a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) 141 permit for hazardous wastes being stored at McClellan Air 
Force Base.142 McClellan Air Force had been listed on the National 
Priorities List pursuant to a CERCLA remedial action.143 The court in 
McClellan stated that when the RCRA permit would be required solely 
because of actions that are part of a CERCLA remedial action, 
"[s]ection 121(e) expressly provides that that [RCRA] activity does 
not have to be separately permitted. "144 
Further, NRC claimed that Congress did not indicate that it 
wished to suspend the waiver provision in section 121(e)(1) with re-
gards to the Corps' FUSRAP activities.145 Accepting the premise that 
the transfer legislation did not "alter the extent of DOE and perhaps 
NRC authority under the AEA," the NRC stated that Congress also did 
not direct the NRC to regulate the Corps' activity.146 With this in 
mind, and in light of the fact that Congress explicitly mentioned that 
the Corps' remedial actions should be governed by CERCLA, the 
NRC concluded that congressional silence indicated that they did not 
want the NRC to regulate the Corps' FUSRAP activities.147 
Further, the NRC asserted that it did not have "regulatory juris-
diction" over Corps FUSRAP activity "regardless of whether response 
actions by the Corps are subject to CERCLA. "148 The NRC claimed 
that it did not even have jurisdiction over twelve of the twenty-one 
FUSRAP sites where remediation had not completed by the time of 
the program transfer.149 The NRC based this argument on the lan-
guage of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UM-
TRCA) of 1978.150 
Many of the sites in FUSRAP were used to process uranium 
ore.151 Since over 2000 pounds of ore were needed to create one to 
five pounds of useable uranium, this created a tremendous amount of 
14142 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000). 
142 763 F. Supp. at 433-34. 
14~ [d. at 434. 
144 [d. at 435. 
145 Corps ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 306. 
146 [d. 
147 [d. 
148 [d. at 307. 
149 [d. 
150 See Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 § 2(b) (1)-(2),42 U.S.C. 
§ 7901 (2000). 
151 See H.R. REp. No. 95-1480(1), at 11 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 7433, 
7433-34. 
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waste.152 Much of this waste was under the control of the federal gov-
ernment, but about twenty-seven tons were left at inactive mill sites 
with little or no regard for their "unstabilized and unprotected condi-
tion. "153 Congress sought to regulate such waste through the NRC li-
censing process, requiring producers of "tailings or wastes produced 
by the extraction of or concentration of uranium or thorium from any 
ore processed primarily for its source material content" to comply 
with NRC guidelines regarding their disposal. 1M 
The NRC stated that prior to the passage of the UMTRCA, nei-
ther the AEC nor the NRC had jurisdiction over uranium tailings or 
similar residual material.155 Mter passage of the UMTRCA, the NRC 
made cleanup of such materials a condition of the renewal of a NRC 
license.l56 Further, the NRC alleged that the previous failure of the 
AEC and the NRC to regulate some of these materials was a product 
of conscious action.157 Therefore, the residual material regulated by 
the UMTRCA created prior to its passage in 1978 was not the subject 
of a subsequent license renewal.15S According to the NRC, waste from 
inactive sites was never subject to NRC regulation.159 As far as the NRC 
was concerned, it could not assert jurisdiction over waste that was 
never the subject of a NRC license.160 This was the situation of twelve 
of the twenty-one sites where remediation had not yet been com-
pleted.161 
B. Envirocare's Various Legal Chalknges to the Corps' Authority 
Envirocare, in a lawsuit that was filed in the United States Court 
of Federal Claims,162 made similar claims to those advanced by the 
152Id. 
155Id. 
154 Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e) (2000). Because the Uranium Mill Tailings 
Radiation Control Act of 1978 amended the AEA's section II(e) definition of by-product 
waste, such waste is called 1l(e)(2) waste. See Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. United States, 44 
Fed. Cl. 474, 477 (1999). 
155 In reUnited States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 49 NRC. 299, 307 (1999). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. "Though the NRC exercised some control over such material in connection with 
licensed processing of ore for source material, it did not exercise jurisdiction at inactive 
sites where no license was in effect." Id. at 308. 
158 Id. at 307. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Corps ofEng'rs, 49 NRC. at 307. 
162 Envirocare (along with the Snake River Alliance) filed a parallel petition before the 
NRC. See generally Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 C.F.R. 2.206, 65 Fed. Reg. 
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NRDC.16S Envirocare claimed that the Corps could not issue contract 
solicitations for FUSRAP activities, because it did not have a NRC li-
cense and because potential "offerors require a[] NRC license in or-
der to accept 11 (e) (2) byproduct material for disposal. "164 Envirocare 
mounted a number of other challenges without success, including a 
collateral attack on the legislation transferring authority over FUSRAP 
from DOE to the Corps.165 
The United States filed a motion to dismiss the case.166 In decid-
ing on the motion, the court discussed the NRC's decision on the 
NRDC petition.167 The court concluded that "[t]he issue addressed in 
the NRC's decision is identical to that raised in Count IV of plaintiffs 
complaint: whether the Corps' FUSRAP activities are subject to NRC 
licensing. "168 Since this decision constituted an agency's final action, 
the "federal courts of appeals have exclusive judicial review. "169 Envi-
rocare subsequently appealed the decision to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.170 The suit was subsequently dis-
missed at the request of both parties.17l 
C. The NRDC Continues the Debate: Challenging the 
NRC's Decision in Congress 
In July 1999, the House Commerce Committee held hearings on 
legislation to reauthorize the NRC.172 The NRDC, fresh off of their 
legal defeat before the NRC, used the hearings as a forum to point 
out the problems with the NRC's decision to not regulate FUSRAP 
79,909 (Dec. 20, 2000). The NRC ruled on this petition on December 13, 2000, but no 
decision has been filed. The NRC issued an order extending the period in which the deci-
sion could be appealed. In re Envirocare of Utah & the Snake River Alliance, 2001 NRC 
LEXIS 2, at *1 (Jan. 5 2001). 
165 Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 474, 478 (1999). 
164 Id. at 477. 
165 Id. at 482-83. The court dismissed this challenge, noting that "Congress can and 
frequently does 'legislate' in appropriation acts." Id. at 482. 
166 Id. at 477. 
167Id. at 478. 
168 Id. 
169 Envirocare, 44 Fed. Cl. at 478. 
170 Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. United States, 217 F.3d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpub-
lished table decision). 
171Id. 
172 See The Nuclear &gulatory Commission Authorization Act For the Fiscal Year 2000: Hearing 
Before the House Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the Comm. on Commerce on H.B. 2531, 106th 
Cong.1 (1999) (statement of Chairman Barton, Chairman of House Subcomm. on Energy 
and Power). 
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waste.173 David Adelman, a project attorney for the NRDC, continued 
to press the public policy rationales for NRC regulation of FUSRAP 
waste.I74 In addition, the NRDC took issue with the NRC's assertion 
that it did not have jurisdiction over many of the FUSRAP sites be-
cause of disputed language in the UMTRCA.175 
As noted earlier, the NRC stated that it did not have jurisdiction 
to regulate the disposal of waste at twelve of the twenty-one unreme-
diated FUSRAP sites,176 This position was based on the NRC's under-
standing that passage of the UMTRCA in 1978 did not extend its 
regulatory authority to the disposal of waste from mills that were inac-
tive at the time of the Act's passage)77 One of the most important fea-
tures of the UMTRCA was a redefinition of by-product material under 
the AEA,178 It has been noted that this effort was made in part to close 
a "regulatory gap" and allow the NRC to regulate radioactive tailings, 
like those contaminating FUSRAP sites. I79 Instead, the NRC claimed 
that because it was only required to attach licensing conditions re-
garding the remediation and disposal of mill tailings at sites licensed 
after passage of the UMTRCA, it did not have jurisdiction to deal with 
inactive sites. I80 The NRDC countered that the NRC's reading of the 
UMTRCA not only misconstrued Congress' intent in passing the 
173 See NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 45-48. 
174 See id. at 46. Substantively, the NRDC's public policy arguments echoed those made 
before the NRC. See In reUnited States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. 299, 302 (1999). 
175 See NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 46-48. The UMTRCA contained two titles: Title 
I provided for cooperative partnership between states and the federal government to 
remediate inactive mill tailing sites and Title II granted the NRC express jurisdiction over 
the production and disposal of mill tailings at active sites. Uranium Mill Tailing Radiation 
Control Act § 2(b) (1)-(2),42 U.S.C. § 7901 (2000). 
176 Corps ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 307-08. 
177 Id. 
178 Uranium Mill Tailing Radiation Control Act § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (2000). Section 
201 provides that: 
Id. 
Section 11 e of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is amended to read as follows: 
e. The term "byproduct material" means (1) any radioactive material (except 
special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the 
radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special nuclear ma-
terial, and (2) the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentra-
tion of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its source 
material content. 
179 See Kerr-McGee Chern. Corp. v. NRC, 902 F.2d 1,7 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
180 In reUnited States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. 299, 307 (1999). 
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UMTRCA, but also was contrary to court decisions interpreting the 
Act. 181 
The NRDC first turned to the language of the UMTRCA.182 
When the UMTRCA was passed, Congress concluded in its "Findings 
and Purpose" section "that there are 'potential and significant radia-
tion hazard[s] to the public' from 'mill tailings located at active and 
inactive mill operations.'''183 Further, the NRDC noted that Congress 
was careful to include programs that would remediate pollution cre-
ated by mill tailings at both inactive and active mill sites.184 Taken to-
gether, the NRDC concluded that "Congress' intent in enacting UM-
TRCA is clear from this language: UMTRCA applies to byproduct 
material generated at sites closed prior to passage of the Act in 
1978."185 The NRDC's assertion that NRC regulatory authority ex-
tends to inactive sites is supported by language from the Congres-
sional reports accompanying the UMTRCA.186 
The NRDC also noted that attempts similar to the NRC's efforts 
to distinguish waste created prior to 1978 from waste generated after 
1978 have been rejected by the courts.187 In support of this position, 
the NRDC cited Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. NRG.188 In Kerr-McGee, the 
court confronted a challenge to a NRC decision to treat two waste 
piles on the same site in West Chicago, Illinois differently "because of 
[their] history. "189 The NRC had attempted to distinguish waste mate-
rials on the basis of the objective for which the ore is first processed 
rather than their physical characteristics.l90 The court was critical of 
the NRC's reading of the UMTRCA, stating that the NRC's interpreta-
tion of the UMTRCA would "frustrate the policy that Congress sought 
to implement. "191 It appeared as though the court found the NRC's 
181 NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 46-47. 
182 [d. at 47. 
183 [d. at 47 (citations omitted) . 
184 See id. at 47. 
185 [d. at 47. 
186 H.R. REp. No. 95-1480(1), at 16 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 7433, 7438. 
The House noted that "[t]he [NRC] should issue all necessary permits or licenses for ura-
nium mill tailings sites." [d.; see also Waste Action Project v. Dawn Mining Corp., 137 F.3d 
1426, 1429 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Thus. UMTRCA was enacted in part to close the regulatory 
gap and give NRC the express authority to regulate mill tailings at inactive sites."). 
187 See NRC Hearings. supra note 103, at 47. 
188 [d. at 47. 
189 Kerr-McGee Chern. Corp. v. NRC, 903 F.2d 1,5 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
190 [d. at 7. Similar to the controversy addressed in this Note. the court in Kerr-McGee 
was confronted by a controversial NRC determination of what constitutes section 11 (e) (2) 
by-product waste. [d. 
191 [d. 
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narrow interpretation of the section 11 (e) (2) language to be wholly 
inconsistent with the UMTRCA's purposes.192 
As the court noted in Kerr-McGee, the UMTRCA was meant to 
augment "the existing regulatory regime to bring mill tailings within 
the NRC's explicit authority and to establish a comprehensive pro-
gram to provide for their safe disposal."193 The court criticized the 
NRC's interpretation of the UMTRCA, because "[it] recreate[d] the 
regulatory gap that the UMTRCA was designed to eliminate and ex-
cludes from regulation for the public health some of the radioactive 
tailings that Congress intended to bring within the [NRC's] author-
ity. "194 Other court rulings also support the NRDC's contention that 
there is no reason to differentiate between pre-I978 and post-I978 
waste. 195 
Mr. Adleman, speaking for the NRDC, also engaged in a discus-
sion with the House Subcommittee on Energy and Power about the 
importance of sending radioactive FUSRAP material to NRC licensed 
disposal sites.196 Before FUSRAP was transferred from DOE to the 
Corps, FUSRAP waste was disposed of at NRC regulated sites197 or at 
"DOE-<>perated sites. "198 In his prepared statement submitted to the 
Subcommittee, Adelman attacked a decision made by the NRC that 
allowed the Corps to dispose of FUSRAP waste at RCRA disposal 
sites.199 He noted that there were very different "monitoring and con-
tainment" requirements between RCRA and NRC licensed landfills.2°O 
In addition, Adelman stated that RCRA licensed landfills were de-
signed to deal with hazardous waste, but had not incorporated 
specific standards needed to deal with radiological contaminants.201 
192 See id. at 8. 
193Id. at 3. 
194Id. at 7. 
195 Waste Action Project v. Dawn Mining Corp., 137 F.3d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Macias v. Kerr-McGee Corp., No. 92-C-3389, 1993 WL 408357, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 
1993). 
196 NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 46, 51-52. 
197 These sites included sites designated by agreement states--states that had assumed, 
under agreement with the NRC, responsibility for regulating nuclear waste. See Montange, 
supra note 4, at 355-56. The NRC requires that the regulatory programs of agreement 
states be "'compatible' with that of NRC." Id. at 356. Indeed, the state requirements may 
be more stringent. Id. 
198 NRC Hearings, supra note 102, at 48. 
199 Id. at 50. 
200 Id. at 51. 
201 Id. at 51-52. The NRC has also noted that 11 (e) (2) waste does not fall under the ju-
risdiction of RCRA. Uranium Mill Facilities, Request for Public Comment, 57 Fed. Reg. 
20,525,20,528 (May 13,1992). 
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He contended that disposal of FUSRAP waste at unlicensed facilities 
would pose various health and environmental risks. 202 
IV. MAKING THE CASE FOR NRC REGULATION OF FUSRAP WASTE: Is 
THE NRDC RIGHT? 
In July 2001, the NRC and the Corps executed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) that sought to solidify the NRC's decision 
on the NRDC's petition.203 While the MOU recognized that the NRC 
had statutory authority over waste at least at some FUSRAP sites, the 
NRC essentially abdicated control over such waste by allowing for the 
suspension of its licensing authority. 2M The MOU failed to critically 
examine the findings made in the NRDC case.205 In particular, the 
MOU simply accepted that the Corps did not need to obtain an NRC 
permit for its remediation activity at FUSRAP sites because of the 
permit waiver contained in CERCIA.206 Further, there was no discus-
sion of the NRC's finding that it had no authority to regulate section 
11 (e) (2) by-product waste created before, and not subject to an NRC 
license at the time of the passage of UMTRCA.207 While the NRC re-
lies on both of these conclusions to avoid oversight of the Corps' 
FUSRAP activity, both are vulnerable to attack and may not be correct 
as a matter oflaw.208 
A. Is the Corps Entitled to the CERCLA Permit Waiver? 
Section 121 (e) of CERCIA exempts most cleanup activities from 
federal, state, and local licensing requirements.209 The Corps claimed, 
and the NRC accepted, that this permit waiver shields Corps FUSRAP 
202 See NRC Hearings, supra note 102, at 48. 
205 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion and the United States Army Corps of Engineers for Coordination of Cleanup and 
Decommissioning of the Formerly Utilized Site Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Sites 
with NRC-Licensed Facilities, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,606, 36,607-08 (July 12, 2001). 
204 Id. Four FUSRAP sites were subject to NRC licensing at the time of the MOU. Id. at 
36,609. 
205 See id. at 36,607. 
206 Id. M[The Corps] as provided for in section 121(e) of CERCLA and 40 CFR 
300.400(e), is not required to obtain a NRC license for its on-site remediation activities 
conducted under its CERCLA authority." Id. at 36,607. 
207 See In re United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. 299, 307-08 (1999); NRC 
Hearings, supra note 103, at 46-48. 
208 See Curps of Eng'rs, 49 N .R.C. at 307-08; NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 46-48. 
209 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (e)(I)-(2) (2000). 
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remediation actions from NRC licensing requirements.210 This con-
tention is vulnerable for several reasons.211 First, the AEA has made 
clear that only DOE remedial actions are exempt from NRC licensing 
requirements.212 Second, the cases relied upon by the NRC and the 
Corps to justify extending the section 121 (e) permit waiver to Corps 
FUSRAP activities do not necessarily support the NRC's decision.213 
1. First Things First: Conflict Between the AEA and CERClA 
The NRC relied almost exclusively on the section 121 (e) permit 
waiver in deciding that it did not have the authority to regulate the 
Corps' FUSRAP activities.214 In its discussion of the applicability of the 
section 121 (e) waiver, however, the NRC ignored the far more narrow 
AEA exemption.215 Under the AEA, only the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (AEC) and its successor agencies (including DOE) are exempt 
from the NRC licensing requirements.216 
In fact, DOE explicitly rejected the Corps' contention that it 
could rely upon the AEA exemption to relieve itself of the burden of 
obtaining a NRC license.217 The AEA made it clear that it was the ex-
clusive province of the AEC (and its successor agencies, ERDA and 
DOE) to dispose of radioactive materials.218 In describing the general 
authority of the AEC, Congress granted the AEC the power to 
"[d]ispose of radioactive materials and make other special disposi-
tions for reasons of national security without regard to the provision of 
other laws."219 Therefore, it would appear that the NRC's decision to 
allow the Corps to dispose of FUSRAP waste without an NRC license 
would contradict congressional intent.22o 
210 corps ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 304-06. 
2ll NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 46-48. 
212 Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(s) (2000). 
m See Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 305-06. 
214 Id. at 309. 
m See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(s). 
216Id. 
217 Corps ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 303. 
218 S. REp. No. 1211, § 12(f), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1336. 
219Id. (emphasis added). 
220 See id.; NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 46. 
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2. A Dubious Proposition: The Corps' Reliance on Section 121 (e) 
Case Law 
267 
In response to the NRDC's contention that the NRC should regu-
late its activities, the Corps claimed that its assertion that the section 
121 (e) permit waiver shielded its FUSRAP activities was supported by 
two decisions interpreting that waiver.221 The Corps acknowledged 
that the permit waiver provision "has been rarely addressed by the 
courts. "222 Nevertheless, the Corps cited two cases that purportedly 
supported its contention that the section 121(e) permit waiver cov-
ered its FUSRAP remediation activities.223 
The applicability of these cases to the Corps' FUSRAP responsi-
bilities is dubious at best.224 For example, in City of Denver, the issue 
was whether or not Denver could use its zoning ordinance to stop re-
medial activity required by an EPA order.225 The EPA issued an order 
requiring a landowner to perform a remedial action on one of his 
parcels contaminated with radium.226 The City countered with an 
"Order to Cease and Desist" that stated that the land was not permit-
ted to maintain a "radioactive disposal or dump site," which it ostensi-
bly would become if the landowner complied with the EPA order.227 
The trial court found that the "Cease and Desist Order [was] void and 
unenforceable pursuant to the Supremacy Clause because it is in di-
rect conflict with the [record of decision] and the EPA order .... "228 
The trial court did not even reach the issue of whether the city's ac-
tion was barred by section 121 (e).229 While the Court of Appeals did 
note that section 121 (e) (1) could indeed override the city's zoning 
ordinances, the Supremacy Clause framed the issue.23o In the case of 
the controversy surrounding the Corps' activities, there is a conflict 
221 Carps ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 305,306. 
222 Id. at 305. 
225 Id. at 305-06; see generally United States v. City of Denver, 916 F. Supp. 1058 (D. 
Colo. 1996), afl'd 100 F.3d 1509 (lOth Cir. 1996); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation 
(MESS) v. Cheney, 763 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Cal. 1989). 
224 See City of Denver, 916 F. Supp. at 1063. 
225 Id. at 1060. 
226Id. 
227Id. 
228Id. 
229 Id. at 1063. 'This result makes it unnecessary to consider the United States' Second 
Claim for Relief regarding CERCLA section 121 (e)( 1) .... HId. 
250 United States v. City of Denver, 100 F.3d 1509, 1513 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
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between two federal agencies with concurrent authority to regulate ra-
dioactive waste.231 
The other case cited by the Corps provides more support for 
NRC's decision not to regulate FUSRAP waste.232 In McClellan Ecologi-
cal Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Cheney, an environmental group chal-
lenged the government's contention that a waste pit at McClellan Air 
Force Base did not require a RCRA permit because the pit was the 
subject of a CERClA remedial action.233 Absent the CERClA reme-
dial action, the court accepted that "a RCRA permit [would be] re-
quired for that activity. "234 The court, however, noted that "[ s] ection 
121 (e) expressly provides that that activity does not have to be sepa-
rately permitted. "235 The problem with relying on this decision to jus-
tify the NRC's decision to allow the Corps to conduct its FUSRAP re-
medial actions without an NRC license is noted in the NRC 
decision.236 As the NRC discussed, the holding in McClellan "was later 
vacated on the basis of subject matter jurisdiction. "237 
B. Illiteracy: The NRC's Reading of the UMTRCA and the 
Folly of Differentiating Between By-Product Waste 
Created Before and After 1978 
Accepting for the sake of argument that the Corps is entitled to 
the section 121 (e) permit waiver for its remedial work conducted at 
FUSRAP sites, it does not necessarily follow that this exemption ex-
tends to activities conducted wholly oJjsite.238 Even the NRC noted that 
the "waiver in section 121 (e) (1) does not apply to offsite activities."239 
Nevertheless, the Corps has read the CERClA waiver to cover offsite 
activities, such as disposal. 240 The Corps has taken advantage of the 
231 FUSRAP REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. 
232 See generally McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Cheney, 763 F. Supp. 
431 (E.D. Cal. 1989). 
233 Id. at 433-36. 
234 Id. at 435. 
235 Id. 
236 In re United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. 299, 305 n.15 (1999). 
237 Id., citing McClellan, 47 F.3d 325. 
238 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (e) (1) (2000); NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 46. 
Offsite activities include transfers of waste and disposal. 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (e) (1) (2000); 
NRC Hearings, supra note 104, at 46. 
239 Carps ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 307. 
240 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, ENGINEER CIRCULAR 200-1-3: OFF-SITE DISPOSAL 
OF MATERIALS FROM THE FORMERLY UTIUZED SITE REMEDIAL ACTION PROGRAM 2 (2000). 
The Corps states that it "will dispose of FUSRAP radioactively contaminated materials only 
at facilities licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ... or at facilities permitted !Jy a 
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NRC's curious reading of the UMTRCA to dispose of FUSRAP waste 
at facilities not licensed by the NRC.241 
The NRC decided that the language of the UMTRCA did not give 
it the authority to regulate FUSRAP waste at sites not licensed by the 
NRC at the time of the passage of UMTRCA.242 Certainly, the NRC is 
correct when it states that it "did not exercise jurisdiction at inactive 
sites where no license was in effect" prior to the passage of the UM-
TRCA.243 Prior to passage of the UMTRCA, uranium mill tailings were 
not included in the definition of "by-product material" in the Atomic 
Energy Act, and therefore not subject to NRC licensing.244 Even the 
court in Kerr-McGee noted that "[a]s early as 1960 ... the AEC had 
concluded that because these mill tailings generally could not be 
classified as source material," and, therefore, could not be regulated 
by the AEC.245 
The fault with NRC's interpretation of the UMTRCA, however, 
lies with its determination that it has no authority whatsoever to regu-
late the disposal of by-product waste created before 1978.246 In Kerr-
McGee Chemical Corp. v. NRC, the NRC tried, and failed, to create a dis-
tinction between waste materials that essentially had the same physical 
characteristics.247 The NRC attempted in Kerr-McGee to draw a regula-
tory line based on the objective for which the "feedstock ore is first 
processed. "248 The court rejected that distinction because the 
definition of '''by-product material' ... adopted by Congress was de-
signed to extend the NRC's regulatory authority over all wastes re-
sulted from the extraction and concentration of source materials in 
the course of the nuclear fuel cycle. "249 
In the case of In re United States Army Corps of Engineers, the NRC is 
essentially attempting to draw a similar, illogical distinction to avoid 
the trouble of ensuring that the Corps dispose of all FUSRAP waste at 
Federal ur state regulatur to accept radioactive materials in accordance with all applicable laws 
and regulations." [d. (emphasis added). 
241 Carps ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 307. 
242 [d. at 307; see discussion supra notes 147-160 and accompanying text. 
24~ Carps ofEng'rs, 49 N.R.C. at 308. 
244 H.R. REp. No. 95-1480(II), at 43 (1978), reprinted in 1978 V.S.C.CAN. 7450, 7470. 
245 Kerr-McGee Chern. Corp. v. NRC, 903 F.2d 1,3 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
246 See id. at 7; see also Waste Action Project v. Dawn Mining Corp., 137 F.3d 1426, 1429 
(9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the "VMfRCA was enacted in part to close the regulatory gap 
and give NRC the express authority to regulate mill tailings at inactive sites"). 
247 See Kerr-McGee, 903 F.2d at 7. 
248 [d. 
249 [d. 
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NRC licensed facilities.25o This time, however, the NRC is trying to 
avoid its responsibility to ensure the safe disposal of radioactive waste 
by differentiating between waste materials created before and after 
passage of the UMTRCA.251 The NRDC has been quick to point out 
that it "make[s] no sense from a technical perspective to base regula-
tion of radioactive waste on when the material was generated. ''252 
When dealing with radioactive materials that remain hazardous for 
thousands of years, time is "not a relevant factor .... "25! Even the 
Corps has noted that FUSRAP waste will remain radioactive for a long 
period.254 
This loophole created by the NRC's reading of the UMfRCA 
leads to absurd results.255 Of the twenty-one remaining FUSRAP sites, 
nine were subject to NRC licensing since passage of the UMTRCA.256 
As a result, waste materials at these sites must be disposed of at NRC-
licensed facilities.257 At the same time, the remaining twelve FUSRAP 
sites, containing similar by-product waste, were inactive mills at the 
passage of the UMTRCA.258 These sites were never subject to NRC li-
censing and therefore, according to the NRC and the Corps, the 
waste at these sites is not by-product waste under the AEA.259 Since the 
NRC does not consider waste at the inactive sites to be covered by the 
AEA, it can be disposed of at facilities that are not licensed by the 
NRC.260 This creates a situation almost identical to that in Kerr-McGee: 
two piles of almost identical waste can be disposed of in different 
ways, one at a site regulated by the NRC and another at a facility not 
equipped to handle radioactive waste.261 
When Congress passed the UMTRCA, the NRC noted that "long-
term release from tailings piles may pose a radiation health hazard if 
the piles are not effectively stabilized .... "262 In reaching its conclu-
sion in Corps of Engineers, the NRC has reversed course by interpreting 
the UMTRCA to allow the Corps to dispose of radioactive waste mate-
250 NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 46-47. 
251 In reUnited States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. 299, 307 (1999). 
252 NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 48. 
253 Id. 
254 FUSRAP REPORT, supra note 3, at 14. 
253 See NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 47. 
256 Id. at 47. 
257Id. 
258 Ill. at 46-47. 
259 Ill. 
260 Ill. at 47. 
261 NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 47. 
262 H.R. REp. No. 95-1480(11), at 25 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7450,7452. 
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rials at sites that are not equipped to handle them.263 In so doing, the 
NRC has undermined the rationale for passage of the UMTRCA, 
eliminating the public health threat created by uranium mill tail-
ings.264 
As noted by David Adelman during his testimony before Con-
gress, allowing the Corps to dispose of FUSRAP waste at RCRA 
landfills is potentially hazardous.265 When Congress passed RCRA, it 
specifically excluded "source, special nuclear, or byproduct material as 
defined by the Atomic Energy Act" from the RCRA definition of solid 
waste.266 The logical import of this decision is clear: Congress did not 
intend to have waste regulated under the AEA further regulated by 
RCRA.267 Therefore, RCRA disposal facilities were not required to be 
designed to receive AEA waste.268 On the other hand, NRC licensed 
facilities are required to comply with tight restrictions on site design 
that are specifically tailored to reduce the chances of the release of 
radioactive waste.269 There are also specific guidelines to protect the 
general population,27o individuals who inadvertently venture onto the 
site,271 and on-site workers from releases.272 In other words, NRC li-
censed disposal facilities are specially designed to deal with radioac-
tive waste in ways that RCRA sites are not. 
Therefore, the NRC's failure to act could have serious long-term 
consequences on both human health and the environment.273 The 
Corps has noted that long-term exposure to these materials can create 
"health risks from chronic exposure and ingestion/inhalation .... "274 
FUSRAP waste generates large amounts of radon, which can cause 
cancer and genetic mutations.275 Further, "individuals may be directly 
263 See NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 4&-48. 
264 See Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 7901 
(2000). 
263 See NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 51-52. 
!66 RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000). 
167 See id. § 6905. In fact, the statute states that "[n]othing in this Act shall be con-
strued to apply to ... any activity or substance which is subject to ... the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 .... " Id. 
268 See id. 
269 See, e.g., NRC Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Wastes, 10 
C.F.R. § 61.52 (2001). 
270 Id. § 61.41. 
271 Id. § 61.42. 
272Id. § 61.43. 
27S See H.R. REp. No. 95-1480(1), at 11 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 7433, 
7433. 
274 See FUSRAP REPORT, supra note 3, at 14. 
275 H.R. REP. No. 95-1480(1), at 11 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 7433, 7433. 
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exposed to gamma radiation from radioactivity in the tailings; and ... 
radioactive and toxic substances from tailings may leach into water 
and then be ingested with food or water, or inhaled following aera-
tion. "276 These potential dangers demonstrate the real risk that the 
NRC is taking by failing to ensure that the Corps dispose of its radio-
active FUSRAP waste properly. 277 
Perhaps the strangest facet of the NRC's decision is that after all 
of the FUSRAP remediation of mill tailings is completed, the NRC will 
have to license the disposal sites.278 While DOE is responsible for cre-
ating guidelines for the disposal of Title I UMTRCA waste, the NRC 
must license the site where FUSRAP mill tailings will ultimately re-
side.279 If nothing else, this makes the NRC's contention that it does 
not have authority to regulate FUSRAP waste a bit specious.28o Rather 
than do it once and do it right, the NRC is allowing the Corps, an 
agency with little institutional knowledge of remediating nuclear 
waste, to dispose of radioactive waste at ill-suited sites.281 In the end, 
the NRC and DOE will both have to deal with the NRC's failure to 
exercise its authority in its field of expertise.282 
CONCLUSION 
The NRC can surely be forgiven for its failure to assert its regula-
tory authority and attempting to avoid the FUSRAP abyss. FUSRAP 
was created at a time when the federal agencies responsible for energy 
research, development, and regulation were in a state of relative 
chaos.283 In fact, when the ERDA created FUSRAP, the NRC did not 
even exist.284 For twenty years after the regulatory functions of the 
ERDA were vested in the NRC, the NRC did not have to concern itself 
with FUSRAP.285 As long as DOE administered FUSRAP, its remedia-
276 Groundwater Standards for Remedial Actions at Inactive Uranium Processing Sites, 
60 Fed. Reg. 2854, 2855 (Jan. 11, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 192). 
277 NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 46. 
278 Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act § 105 (b) , 42 U.S.C. § 7915(b) (2000). 
279Id. 
280 See In re United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 49 N.R.C. 299, 307-08 (1999); NRC 
Hearings, supra note 103, at 46-48. 
281 See, e.g., NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 45-48. 
282 See Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act § 105(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7915(b); 
NRC Hearings, supra note 103, at 48. 
28S See discussion supra Part I.C. 
284 See discussion supra Part LB. 
285 See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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tion activities were shielded from NRC regulation by an AEA exemp-
tion.286 
Of course, Congress changed all of this when it shifted day-to-day 
responsibility for FUSRAP from DOE to the Corps.287 This change 
dropped the problem of FUSRAP squarely in the lap of the NRC.288 
By removing FUSRAP from DOE control, the remediation and dis-
posal of FUSRAP waste was no longer protected by the AEA exemp-
tion.289 While Congress ordered the Corps to remediate pursuant to 
CERCIA standards, DOE, the NRC, and EPA all have standards for 
the cleanup of radioactive materials.29o It is not surprising that the 
NRC had a difficult time determining the appropriate standards for 
the remediation and disposal of FUSRAP waste. 
The strange birth and reckless transfer of FUSRAP from DOE to 
the Corps, however, does not excuse the NRC's failure to regulate the 
manner in which the Corps administrates FUSRAP.291 By allowing the 
Corps to take advantage of the CERCIA permit waiver, the NRC has 
failed to acknowledge the fact that radioactive waste has consistently 
been subject to a different regulatory regime than other types of haz-
ardous waste.292 Until the NRC's decision in the case of In re United 
States Army Corps of Engineers, it was the exclusive province of the AEC 
I and its successor agencies to handle and dispose of radioactive I waste.293 The NRC has now allowed the Corps, an organization with 
)
1 almost no experience in handling radioactive materials, to administer 
a program created to remove radioactive waste without any NRC over-
sight.294 
Further, the failure of NRC to adequately oversee the disposal of 
dangerous radioactive waste has allowed the Corps to dispose of this 
waste at sites that are not equipped to handle them.295 The NRC 
should recognize that Congress was concerned about the health 
, threats posed by all radioactive mill tailings when it passed the UM-
TRCA.296 Waste materials located at inactive sites when the UMTRCA 
286 See discussion supra Part I.C. 
287 See discussion supra Part II. 
288 See discussion supra Part II. 
289 See discussion supra Parts II & III.A 1. 
290 See discussion supra Part II. 
291 See discussion supra Parts III.A & Part IV. 
292 See discussion supra Part IVA.I. 
29~ See discussion supra Part IV.A 1. 
294 See discussion supra Part IVA 1-2. 
295 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
296 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
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was passed are just as dangerous as those at active sites.297 Previous 
attempts by the NRC to distinguish between waste materials that have 
substantially similar physical characteristics have failed.298 This effort 
to distinguish between waste materials that remain dangerous for 
thousands of years should also be rejected. 
297 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
298 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
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